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Speeded retrieval abolishes the false memory suppression effect: Evidence for the 
Distinctiveness Heuristic  
 
Abstract 
We examined two different accounts of why studying distinctive 
information reduces false memories within the DRM paradigm.  The 
impoverished relational encoding account predicts that less memorial information, 
such as overall famililarity, is elicited by the critical lure after distinctive 
encoding than after non-distinctive encoding.  By contrast, the distinctiveness 
heuristic predicts that participants use a deliberate retrieval strategy to withhold 
responding to the critical lures.  This retrieval strategy refers to a decision rule 
whereby the absence of memory for expected distinctive information is taken as 
evidence for an event’s nonoccurrence.  We show that the typical false 
recognition suppression effect only occurs when the recognition test is self-paced.  
This suppression effect is abolished when participants make recognition decisions 
under time-pressure, such as within 1 second of seeing the test item.  These results 
are consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic account that a time-consuming 
retrieval strategy is used to reduce false recognition responses. 
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Speeded retrieval abolishes the false memory suppression effect: Evidence for the 
Distinctiveness Heuristic  
There has been growing interest in mechanisms and procedures that 
reduce the occurrence of false memories (e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2001, 2002a, 
2002b; Gallo et al., 2001; Hege & Dodson, submitted; Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 
1999; Smith & Hunt, 1998; see Dodson, Koutstal, & Schacter, 2000 for a review).  
For example, with the DRM paradigm (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995) an 
increasing number of studies show reductions in false memories for related lure 
items when studied items were encoded in a distinctive manner, such as being 
presented with distinctive fonts, as pictures, as anagrams, and so forth (e.g., Arndt 
& Reder, 2003; Dodson & Schacter, 2001; Hicks & Marsh, 1999; Schacter et al., 
1999; Seamon et al., 2003).   
Two different mechanisms can explain why studying distinctive 
information reduces false memories.  One mechanism that we call the 
distinctiveness heuristic refers to a metacognitive retrieval strategy whereby 
people infer that an item is novel when they fail to remember expected memorial 
information about this item (e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2002; Schacter et al., 1999; 
for similar ideas see Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Collins et al., 1975; Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Hicks & Marsh, 1999; Strack & Bless, 1994).  
Despite a test item’s high degree of familiarity, as in the case of a related lure 
item in the DRM paradigm, the absence of memory for expected distinctive 
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information is evidence for an item’s novelty.  This retrieval strategy deliberately 
counters familiarity-based responses that, if left unchecked, would contribute to 
the occurrence of false memories. 
An alternative mechanism for reducing false memories is one that we call 
impoverished relational encoding (Dodson & Hege, 2003; Hege & Dodson, 
submitted).  According to this account, studying distinctive information interferes 
with the encoding of relational information.  As related lure items are associated 
with studied items, decreased memory for relational information would decrease 
responses to the critical lures.  This account builds on Hunt and colleagues’ 
distinction between item-specific and relational information (e.g,., Hunt & 
McDaniel, 1993; Smith & Hunt, 1998; see also Arndt & Reder, 2003).  Focusing 
on the characteristics of the item, via distinctive encoding, may reduce false 
memories because it decreases the spread of activation from the studied items to 
the related lure (e.g., McEvoy, Nelson & Komatsu, 1999; Roediger, Balota & 
Watson, 2001; Roediger, Watson, McDermott & Gallo, 2001) or it decreases gist 
representations (e.g., Brainerd, Wright, Reyna & Mojardin, 2001).   
The central difference between the foregoing mechanisms concerns the 
memorial information that is evoked by the related lures in the DRM paradigm 
after participants have encoded the items in a distinctive manner.  The 
distinctiveness heuristic predicts that related lures will elicit a high degree of 
familiarity which must be countered via this retrieval strategy.  By contrast, the 
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impoverished relational encoding account predicts that the critical lures will elicit 
less familiarity after the studied items were encoded in a distinctive than in a non-
distinctive manner.   
There is conflicting evidence in favor of both accounts.  We (Dodson & 
Hege, 2003; Hege & Dodson, in press) observed that when participants were 
given recall instructions that should have disabled the distinctiveness heuristic, 
the critical lures were still less likely to come to mind after picture encoding than 
after word encoding.  That is, regardless of whether participants were instructed to 
recall studied items only or to recall both studied items and items that were related 
to what was studied, such as critical lures, participants in a picture-encoding 
condition were less likely to report the critical lures on either recall test than were 
participants in a word-encoding condition.  Thus, in contrast to the distinctiveness 
heuristic but in support of the impoverished relational encoding account, the 
related lures appear less available in general after distinctive encoding of the 
studied items.  Further support for the impoverished relational encoding account 
comes from Arndt and Reder (2003) who presented some DRM lists at encoding 
in distinctive fonts and other lists in standard fonts.  Participants showed lower 
false recognition rates to critical lures that were related to the lists of items 
presented in the distinctive than in the non-distinctive fonts.  These results pose 
problems for the distinctiveness heuristic account because it would predict 
reduced false recognition rates to all critical lures, as opposed to the observed 
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selective reduction.  Overall then, the foregoing studies support the impoverished 
relational encoding’s prediction that critical lures elicit less memorial information 
(e.g., less likely to come to mind, less familiar) after distinctive encoding of the 
studied items.   
However, Schacter, Cendan, Dodson and Clifford (2001) provided 
evidence in favor of the distinctiveness heuristic with a test instruction 
manipulation similar to the one used by Hege and Dodson (in press).  Whereas 
Hege and Dodson examined recall performance, Schacter et al examined 
recognition performance when participants were provided with test instructions 
that should either disable or evoke the use of the distinctiveness heuristic.  
Specifically, when particpants received inclusion recognition instructions to 
endorse both studied items as well as related items that matched the theme of 
previously studied items, there were no significant differences between the two 
encoding conditions in responses to critical lures.  By contrast, when participants 
received standard recognition instructions to endorse studied items only, fewer 
critical lures were falsely recognized after picture encoding than after word 
encoding.  This pattern of data suggests that a retrieval strategy underlies this 
false recognition suppression effect because it is essentially turned off and on with 
a retrieval manipulation.   
However, an alternative interpretation of the foregoing results, consistent 
with the impoverished relational encoding account, is that inclusion recognition 
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instructions allow participants to compensate for a critical lure’s lesser familiarity 
after picture encoding than after word encoding.  For example, after studying 
“desk, seat, sit, table, etc.” participants could endorse the critical lure “chair” on 
an inclusion recognition test, not because “chair” evokes a strong sense of 
familiarity, but because participants are aware that “chair” is related to what was 
studied.  This awareness would allow participants to recognize critical lures on 
the test even though the lures themselves evoke little familiarity or other 
memorial information.  Thus, there appear to be no data from the DRM paradigm 
that unambiguously support the distinctiveness heuristic hypothesis.   
The present study examined the distinctiveness heuristic and impoverished 
relational encoding hypotheses by comparing performance under speeded and 
non-speeded recognition conditions.  If the reduction in false recognition after 
picture encoding is due to a deliberate and effortful retrieval strategy, then 
responding under time pressure at test should disrupt the use of this retrieval 
strategy.  Specifically, under non-speeded conditions we should replicate existing 
studies and observe lower false recognition rates of the critical lures after picture 
encoding than after word encoding.  By contrast, speeded recognition conditions 
should disable the use of the distinctiveness heuristic and, therefore, eliminate or 
reduce the false recognition suppression effect that occurs after picture encoding 
as compared to word encoding.  Thus, this experiment is a deciding test of the 
distinctiveness heuristic hypothesis. 
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Method 
Participants. One hundred twenty-six University of Virginia 
undergraduate students participated in this study (83 female and 43 male), with 21 
participants in each condition.  
Design and Materials.  A 2 (encoding condition:  picture vs. word) x 3 
(time pressure:  self-paced, 1000 msec, 750 msec) between-participants design 
was used.  The stimuli consisted of 273 black and white pictures, used by 
Schacter et al. (1999), which were based on the lists used by Roediger and 
McDermott (1995).  These items were divided into 21 lists of semantically related 
items.  Each list consisted of 12 related items and one critical, nonpresented lure.  
For counterbalancing purposes, the 21 lists were divided into three sets of seven 
lists so that, across participants, each list appeared at study and also served as a 
source for new words on the test.  Each participant studied 14 lists with 12 items 
per list.  The recognition test consisted of 14 false targets (nonpresented, critical 
lures), seven false target controls (critical lures from seven non-studied lists), 28 
true targets (studied items), and 14 true target controls (unrelated new items), for 
a total of 63 test items.  There were an additional 80 unrelated items that were 
used in a separate practice session.  The recognition test items were presented as 
words for all participants, regardless of encoding condition (e.g., Schacter et al., 
2001). 
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Procedure. There were three consecutive stages: encoding; a practice 
phase for responding quickly; and a recognition test.  During the encoding stage, 
all of the lists of related items were presented as a continuous sequence at a rate of 
one item every three seconds.  In the picture encoding condition, each study item 
was presented as an auditory word with a corresponding picture; in the word 
encoding condition, each study item was presented as an auditory word and as a 
visual word.  Participants were instructed to try to remember all of the items 
because a memory test would follow.  After the encoding phase, all participants 
were given extensive practice with responding under speeded conditions.  This 
practice session consisted of two parts.  First, participants were presented with a 
list of 40 words to remember.  These words were unrelated to anything presented 
during the encoding stage.  Then, participants completed a speeded recognition 
test that was based on only these practice study items.   
At the conclusion of this practice phase, participants were presented with 
the instructions for the recognition test.  All participants were informed that this 
test would consist of words and was based only on the information from the initial 
encoding phase.  They were told to indicate whether each test item was “OLD” 
(i.e., it or a picture of it had been seen earlier during the study phase) or “NEW” 
(i.e., it or a picture of it had not been seen earlier during the study phase).  
Participants in the non-speeded condition were informed that the test was self-
paced.  By contrast, participants in the 1000 msec and 750 msec conditions were 
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warned that they would have 1 second or 750 msec, respectively, to respond to 
each test item.  In addition, they were informed that if they did not answer within 
that time limit, “TOO SLOW” would flash on the screen, accompanied by a loud 
beep.  They were asked to respond as quickly as possible, in an attempt to avoid 
the appearance of the “TOO SLOW” warning.  Because it was critical for 
participants assigned to one of the speeded conditions to respond within the given 
time limit, an extra incentive was offered at the beginning of the final memory 
test.  Participants were told that if they were able to respond in time, such that 
“TOO SLOW” appeared fewer than five times (i.e., less than 8% of the total 
number of test items), they would be paid an additional $2.00.  Nearly everyone 
complied with these directions and was able to respond in time.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows the probabilities of responding “old” to targets, target 
controls, false targets, and false target controls under non-speeded (i.e., self-
paced) and speeded test conditions.  Figures 1 and 2 present corrected false 
recognition rates to the false targets and corrected true recognition rates to the 
studied items, respectively.   
As predicted by the distinctiveness heuristic, there was a significant 
suppression effect after picture encoding, relative to word encoding, in the self-
paced condition but not in either of the speeded conditions.  That is, participants 
falsely recognized fewer critical lures after picture encoding (30%) than after 
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word encoding (51%) when the recognition test was self-paced, t (40) = 2.93, p < 
.01, replicating previous studies (e.g., Schacter, Cendan, Dodson, & Clifford, 
2001; Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999).  By contrast, there were no significant 
differences between the two encoding conditions when the recognition test 
required a response within either 1000 ms, t (40) = 1.10, or 750 ms, t (40) < .40. 
However, the distinctiveness heuristic makes the specific prediction that 
the false recognition suppression effect (i.e., the difference in false recognition 
rates between the two encoding conditions) is greater when the recognition test is 
self-paced than when it is completed under time pressure.  By contrast, the 
impoverished relational encoding account predicts comparable differences 
between the two encoding conditions at all test conditions.  We measured the false 
recognition suppression effect with difference scores that were derived from 
subtracting the false recognition rate to the critical lures in the picture-encoding 
condition from this rate in the word-encoding condition.  We then tested the 
predictions of the two hypotheses by performing a planned weighted contrast of 
the difference scores from the self-paced condition against the combined speeded 
conditions, F (1, 60) = 8.87, Mse = .079, p < .01.  As predicted by the 
distinctiveness heuristic, there was a greater false recognition suppression effect 
in the self-paced condition than in the speeded conditions. 
Because there was some variability in false recognition rates of the false 
target controls, we also performed the foregoing set of analyses on the corrected 
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false recognition rates of the false targets.  As with the uncorrected scores, we 
replicated previous studies in the self-paced recognition condition and observed 
lower corrected false recognition rates of the critical lures when participants 
studied pictures (40%) than when they studied words (24%), t (40) = 2.21, p < 
.05.  And, as shown in Figure 1, there were nearly identical corrected false 
recognition rates between the two encoding conditions under both of the speeded 
recognition conditions, t’s (40) < .40.  Importantly, the planned weighted contrast 
of the difference scores from the self-paced condition against the combined 
speeded conditions was significant, F (1, 60) = 9.63, Mse = .078, p < ..01.  
Overall then, this selective false recognition suppression effect in the self-paced 
recognition condition fits the predictions of the distinctiveness heuristic.  
With respect to true recognition performance, Figure 2 shows that 
participants in the picture- and word-encoding conditions recognized similar 
amounts of studied items.  Moreover, as participants were given less time to 
respond, true recognition rates declined in the same manner, regardless of 
encoding condition.  Since neither the distinctiveness heuristic nor the 
impoverished relational encoding account makes precise predictions about true 
recognition performance we performed a 3 (time pressure) x 2 (encoding) 
ANOVA of the recognition rates to studied items.  This analysis yielded a 
significant effect of time pressure, F (2, 120) = 19.55, MSe = .03, p < .001, such 
that speeded responding produced lower correct recognition rates.  There were no 
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other significant effects.  A 3 (time pressure) x 2 (encoding) ANOVA of the 
corrected recognition rates revealed the same pattern: a significant effect of time 
pressure, F (2, 120) = 53.78, MSe = .038, p < .001, and no other significant 
effects.  As is readily apparent in Figure 2, at each time pressure interval there 
was no difference in corrected recognition rates between the two encoding 
conditions, all t’s (40) < 1.68.  
The central finding of this experiment is that time pressure – via speeded 
recognition responses – eliminates the false recognition suppression effect that 
occurs after picture encoding.  However, time pressure affects true recognition 
rates in the same manner, regardless of encoding condition.  These results are 
consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic account that a time-consuming 
retrieval strategy is used to reduce false recognition responses.   
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Table 1 
Proportion of “old” responses on the recognition test as a function of item-type, 
encoding condition and time pressure at test 
 
 
Encoding Condition 
Word Picture 
Self-Paced 
1000 
msec 
750 
msec 
Self-Paced 
1000 
msec 
750 msec 
True 
Targets 
.74 .58 .54 .72 .47 .50 
True 
Target 
Controls 
.13 .21 .35 .09 .20 .32 
False 
Targets 
.51 .54 .56 .30 .47 .54 
False 
Target 
Controls 
.11 .26 .42 .06 .18 .41 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  Corrected false recognition rates for each time pressure condition after 
studying words or pictures. Vertical bars indicate the standard error of the mean.  
 
Figure 2.  Corrected true recognition rates for each time pressure condition after 
studying words or pictures. Vertical bars indicate the standard error of the mean 
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